【💡💡營運小教室-第26堂】
🕹營運小教室:MECE原則🕹
營運常提到一個詞叫精細化,究竟什麼叫精細化?然後可以多精細?可能每個人定義都不同,做出來也不同。
而「分眾」就是精細化的其中一環,概念跟行銷一樣,今天新品上市要投放數位廣告,選擇的目標對象絕對不會是全台灣人,因為基本上這樣打,預算沒兩下就會全燒光,然後得到一堆無效投放。
因此數位投放最重要的事情就是要先設定受眾,通常會使用STP分析策略幫助我們把市場進行區隔,然後最終選出目標受眾,根據受眾的用戶輪廓鎖定性別、學歷、居住地區、年齡、興趣等標籤進行廣宣投放,讓每筆投放出去的預算都是向對的人溝通。
而營運分眾也是,今天設計一檔營運操作,一定有我們預期的目標受眾,例如針對重度付費玩家設計營收,我們就不會去賣他99元低價禮包,一點意義都沒有,比較常做的可能是滿額贈搭配吸引人的虛寶,或用轉蛋搭配保底的方式操作。
分眾有個基本概念需要掌握,就是「MECE原則」,MECE的英文叫做「(Mutually Exclusive Collectively Exhaustive)」,翻譯成中文叫做「彼此獨立,互無遺漏」,也就是將重大議題,做到不重疊、不遺漏的分類,藉此有效把握問題核心。
以車子顏色來舉例,如果今天我們想以車子顏色進行分類,你可以分成:白色的車、白色以外的車,這就符合MECE原則提到的「彼此獨立,互無遺漏」,因為已經囊括了所有顏色的車(但分得很爛,只是方便理解而做舉例而已),但如果分法是白色的車和藍色的車,那就不符合MECE原則,因為還有紅色、黃色、黑色等各種顏色的車都沒算進去。
營運分眾也需要遵守「MECE原則」,才能評估每一群是否有需要個別營運的價值,方便設定目標與後續成效分析。
其實仔細觀察,就會發現很多營運提到的概念都是遵守MECE原則,例如我最常提到的營收方程式:營收 = 登入數 X 付費率 X 客單價就是,不會突然有人說還有哪個指標沒算進去;而就客單價來說,也能再進一步區分為不付費,輕度、中度、重度,也是運用MECE原則來幫助我們再次分眾,以確保每位玩家都有納入分眾內。
因此總結一下,營運通常會用來分眾的指標主要有三個:
1⃣時間:新用戶、活躍用戶、回流用戶
2⃣金額:不付費、輕度~重度付費
3⃣行為:已經註冊、通過新手教學、等級達20等、完成第三章、已經轉職等等
其他可能還有RFM模型會用到的付費頻率等,就不多贅述。
再舉例,像是AARRR海盜模式、PDCA循環式品質管理、八何分析法(6W2H)、SWOT、4P分析等,都是有「MECE原則」的概念,幫助我們在思考、企劃上能夠用更全面、縝密的角度檢視,避免出現遺漏。
而缺乏「MECE原則」會有什麼後果呢?其實就是不夠細心。
例如:
❌規劃一檔企劃活動,沒有使用八何分析法(6W2H),導致整份企劃案一下缺目的,一下缺預算、又缺時間排程等等,東缺西漏、零零散散
❌想分析成效,登入數卻看一整包用戶,忘了把新用戶和回流用戶分出來,導致推導出來的數據不夠嚴謹或有偏失
❌發想一個提案,許多假設與邏輯驗證有缺漏,即使idea再好都有可能被老闆打槍。
因此,隨時留意並遵守「MECE原則」,不管在營運規劃、活動提案、數據分析上,幫助都非常大,也能幫助我們在工作上事半功倍。
以上就是今天營運小教室分享的內容,希望對你有些啟發,
下次見!
備註:「MECE原則」是一種思考工具,任何工具使用上過與不及都不好,無謂地追求精細化也沒意義,如果細到受眾已經太少或沒價值,那也只是徒增營運上的複雜度與操作而已,絕對沒必要!
#文章同步部落格
#重點都畫好囉
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
「collectively中文」的推薦目錄:
- 關於collectively中文 在 玩遊戲不難,做營運好難 Facebook 的最佳解答
- 關於collectively中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳解答
- 關於collectively中文 在 國家衛生研究院-論壇 Facebook 的精選貼文
- 關於collectively中文 在 コバにゃんチャンネル Youtube 的最讚貼文
- 關於collectively中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最佳貼文
- 關於collectively中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的精選貼文
- 關於collectively中文 在 WTF Collective 3 中文字幕by 護田 - YouTube 的評價
- 關於collectively中文 在 What is the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC)? - Google ... 的評價
- 關於collectively中文 在 This is what happens on the interent every minute - The World ... 的評價
collectively中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳解答
【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
collectively中文 在 國家衛生研究院-論壇 Facebook 的精選貼文
➥在本期Lancet期刊中,Dr. Gilbert及其團隊預測,埃及、阿爾及利亞、及南非最有機會成為非洲武漢肺炎的破口,但他們也較有能力來對付這個疾病;奈及利亞、埃塞俄比亞、蘇丹、安哥拉、坦尚尼亞、迦納、及肯亞成為破口的機會較小,但他們也較無能力對付。
非洲國家應善用這項研究結果備戰武漢肺炎。首先,非洲需要一個整個洲的準備及應變措施。會員國、資助者、及合作者應釋出經濟資源以支援各個國家的計畫。
目前,非洲聯盟委員會、非洲CDC、WHO及非洲各國已建立了一個「非洲冠狀病毒防範和應對工作團隊」(AFTCOR),這個工作團隊主要六個工作項目:實驗室診斷及分類、監測,包括機場港口等入口點及邊境、醫療照顧機構的感染預防及控制、武漢肺炎重症者之臨床處置、風險溝通、及供應鏈的管理與庫存。
第二,有效的防範與應對措施需要各國在政策上強力支持。
第三,資助者及合作者之經濟資源應在危機抵達非洲之前到位。
第四,國家、地區、及國際組織應通力合作,使用政府資源,以確保物資。
第五,各會員國應盡速制訂隔離及感染控制方案,包括社會隔離的措施。
最後,由非洲CDC及WHO主導之人員訓練應盡速執行並導入各國醫療系統。如同WHO秘書長所言,機會之窗正在縮小,非洲需要馬上行動。(中文摘要轉譯:「財團法人國家衛生研究院」莊淑鈞博士整理)
📋Looming threat of COVID-19 infection in Africa: act collectively, and fast (2020/02/27)+中文摘要轉譯
➥Author:John N Nkengasong, Wessam Mankoula
➥Link: The Lancet
https://is.gd/xeIVcK
#2019COVID19Academic
衛生福利部
疾病管制署 - 1922防疫達人
疾病管制署
國家衛生研究院-論壇
collectively中文 在 コバにゃんチャンネル Youtube 的最讚貼文
collectively中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最佳貼文
collectively中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的精選貼文
collectively中文 在 What is the Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC)? - Google ... 的推薦與評價
With the passage of the Music Modernization Act (MMA) in the United States in October 2018, the U.S. music industry is changing how it licenses digital ... ... <看更多>
collectively中文 在 This is what happens on the interent every minute - The World ... 的推薦與評價
Collectively, these produce unimaginable quantities of user activity and associated data. Here are just some of the key figures of what ... ... <看更多>
collectively中文 在 WTF Collective 3 中文字幕by 護田 - YouTube 的推薦與評價
... <看更多>