【嬰兒經 | 盧斯達 on Patreon】
現在,藍絲長輩們都會問:「點解大學生依家會變成抗議一代?」
我答,其實很簡單,因為你們由細到大,對他們煞有介事地灌輸了一些仁義道德的「教育」,試圖令他們成為一個有尊嚴的好人,所以他們就咁慘。
黃絲長輩問:「難道仁義道德、教育是不好的嗎?」
我回答:「道德教化和人格提升永遠是好的,但我們最好有一個這些價值能夠多少實現的現實世界,否則你首先會為接受這種道德的人帶來極大痛苦。」
以前學校曾經有「公民教肓課」。現在我經常嘲弄這類教程,認為他們都是教人過馬路要遵守交通燈指示、不要亂丟垃圾、有選票要投票之類。至此之後,一切都會開始有積極價值判斷。例如政權透過官方行為去展示自己認同「見義勇為」:當你舉報或協助處理了一單重大案件,你可能獲頒「好市民獎」,認同和鼓勵人們的道德自發性。
「舉報罪案」背後的道德詮釋就是不容忍不義。整個社會也有類似的耳濡目染,並鼓勵別人做一個正義的人。甚麼是正義是一個不斷變化的奧秘,但「對抗不義」作為某種人人可為的、彰顯正義的方法,乃是通過各種媒體持續教化。每一部宗教經典、電影和故事拆解到最初,都是 protagonist 對抗 antagonist 的模型。小丑雖然迷人,但蝙蝠俠無疑顯得更有尊嚴。《蝙蝠俠》的宣傳能力自然強過「公民教肓課」,那麼我們都會在過程中認同了「對抗不義」的主題。在成龍電影,我們同樣獲得「邪不能勝正」的寓言。在中國文化,人們也歌頌屈原、岳飛、文天祥這些歷史上的敗方,頌揚其死守信念的氣節,認為這些敗方比起勝過他們的人,更有尊嚴。道德自發性,可能引發社會動蕩,或者影響惡人的既得利益。
人類都在教下一代理論上應成為一個有尊嚴自覺的人。有尊嚴的人,就是把自己看成人,把自己看得重要,也對自己有若干要求。有一定尊嚴的人,被侮辱會感到不悅,但沒有特別尊嚴的奴隸,則不會有一樣身心反應。曾經的公家宣傳片也會教人:「被人侵犯,要識得嗌唔好,仲要大聲叫救命,馬上去到安全既地方,將件事話俾你信任既人聽」,因為一個有尊嚴的人,被人侵犯時要識得反應。
刑事犯會被公訴,由檢控官代表「公眾」控訴某個人。其實犯罪者即使入獄,被侵犯的權益多數不能恢復,希望事後恢復的是受害者名譽。整個儀式只為重新宣告人的尊嚴不可侵犯,並對觸犯者施以刑罰。於是世界上很多衝突拆解到最後,可能都是由心理層面維護尊嚴的衝動而引發。一個人和人之間的尊嚴之爭,極端時可能以制裁/仇殺告終。一個群體與另一個群體的尊嚴之爭,最極端時則發展為國與國之間的戰爭。
一個殺人如麻的日本兵,腦海裡可能還埋藏著童年時期的片段,老師教他們要成為一個好孩子。那麼「好孩子」的概念,後來發展成忠誠、服從、奉公,在大時代的氛圍下也是合理發展。然後聽到日本被欺負了,國家利益受損,自己也義憤填膺。後來他在軍隊和教官的影響下,得到了皇軍的尊嚴,最後用絕對服從軍令來餵養這份尊嚴心。另一方面,無數「好人好事」、為他人自我犧牲的案例,救災、留守、奉獻,則同樣是一樣的尊嚴心、榮譽感在運作。
香港開埠180年,特別是麥理浩十年,英國人真是埋下了現代性的炸彈。當時英國已經知道香港不會被允許解殖,但也把香港搞得非常現代化,廉政公署新市鎮地鐵郊野公園,目標是培養出香港人的自豪感,提醒他們,雖然你們以前是難民,但你們現在是「香港居民」,這個身份豪得珍惜,香港 (67暴動之後無事) 可以安居樂業,值得你們自豪。90年代一些商品廣告,都會用香港咁好,點捨得離開的講法。港英又在放手撤出階段,以白臉的方式手把手教導香港人面對政府,可以挺直腰板,據理可以力爭,有不滿可以投訴,政府向公眾問責的「普世價值」,這便是為了當時的香港人尊嚴充份加油。西方所謂公民,東方所謂君子,就是描述一群有尊嚴自覺的先鋒黨。然而這班很有自我意識的人,相互之間自然充滿各種競爭和衝突,也容易不滿,或至少可能不滿。
一群特別有尊嚴的人,就因為自發性充份發揮而特別優秀,但也特別脆弱,他們的尊嚴總可能受傷。或者尼采發現的困境:強者無法適應弱者統治的世界,甚至被後者包圍和迫害。這就是藍絲和黃絲賢達研究的大學生問題。教育教人要有尊嚴,大學生自然是理論上比較有尊嚴。一班有尊嚴的人自然有一種先天下之憂而憂的批判意識。父母教小孩子做個好人,是為他好,還是終有一天害了他?讓他有可能成為一個像嬰兒一樣自我而不妥協的人?成為因不識時務而受罰的好人?
尊嚴意識既然帶來競爭和變動,是否只要大家都沒有尊嚴,即會天下太平?問題是人們有樣學樣,追求逼格這件事就在不斷傳染。菁英和長老無符。因為有了自我意識,人們就得以經歷自己這個人格的榮辱;有了集團,就得以經歷集體的榮辱,人通過想像出集體而獲得更強烈的競爭和生存意識。雖然,這也是紛爭與互相侮辱的源頭。
美國學者管禮雅 (Liah Greenfeld) 在其名為《關於國族主義全球化的十個主張》(10 Claims Regarding the Globalization of Nationalism) 的演講內容,如題,對於國族主義是甚麼,有十個主張,第十個這樣說:「國族主義為人們帶來平民主權,帶來平等,帶來包容性的社會——即民主政治。它為人們帶來一種個人的尊嚴,我們亦因它而永遠徘徊在世界大戰的邊緣。」(Claim 10: Nationalism brings us popular sovereignty, equality, inclusive society – that is, democracy. It brings us personal dignity. And it forever keeps us on the brink of a world war.)
人和集體的思慮,由簡樸而複雜。很少可以回轉為嬰兒。嬰兒是在時光中陣亡的先行者。嬰兒鞠躬下台,成為一種有著朦朧的禁忌意識的成年人。
訂閱 patreon https://www.patreon.com/lewisdada
globalization of democracy 在 無待堂 Facebook 的最讚貼文
【嬰兒經 | 盧斯達 on Patreon】
現在,藍絲長輩們都會問:「點解大學生依家會變成抗議一代?」
我答,其實很簡單,因為你們由細到大,對他們煞有介事地灌輸了一些仁義道德的「教育」,試圖令他們成為一個有尊嚴的好人,所以他們就咁慘。
黃絲長輩問:「難道仁義道德、教育是不好的嗎?」
我回答:「道德教化和人格提升永遠是好的,但我們最好有一個這些價值能夠多少實現的現實世界,否則你首先會為接受這種道德的人帶來極大痛苦。」
以前學校曾經有「公民教肓課」。現在我經常嘲弄這類教程,認為他們都是教人過馬路要遵守交通燈指示、不要亂丟垃圾、有選票要投票之類。至此之後,一切都會開始有積極價值判斷。例如政權透過官方行為去展示自己認同「見義勇為」:當你舉報或協助處理了一單重大案件,你可能獲頒「好市民獎」,認同和鼓勵人們的道德自發性。
「舉報罪案」背後的道德詮釋就是不容忍不義。整個社會也有類似的耳濡目染,並鼓勵別人做一個正義的人。甚麼是正義是一個不斷變化的奧秘,但「對抗不義」作為某種人人可為的、彰顯正義的方法,乃是通過各種媒體持續教化。每一部宗教經典、電影和故事拆解到最初,都是 protagonist 對抗 antagonist 的模型。小丑雖然迷人,但蝙蝠俠無疑顯得更有尊嚴。《蝙蝠俠》的宣傳能力自然強過「公民教肓課」,那麼我們都會在過程中認同了「對抗不義」的主題。在成龍電影,我們同樣獲得「邪不能勝正」的寓言。在中國文化,人們也歌頌屈原、岳飛、文天祥這些歷史上的敗方,頌揚其死守信念的氣節,認為這些敗方比起勝過他們的人,更有尊嚴。道德自發性,可能引發社會動蕩,或者影響惡人的既得利益。
人類都在教下一代理論上應成為一個有尊嚴自覺的人。有尊嚴的人,就是把自己看成人,把自己看得重要,也對自己有若干要求。有一定尊嚴的人,被侮辱會感到不悅,但沒有特別尊嚴的奴隸,則不會有一樣身心反應。曾經的公家宣傳片也會教人:「被人侵犯,要識得嗌唔好,仲要大聲叫救命,馬上去到安全既地方,將件事話俾你信任既人聽」,因為一個有尊嚴的人,被人侵犯時要識得反應。
刑事犯會被公訴,由檢控官代表「公眾」控訴某個人。其實犯罪者即使入獄,被侵犯的權益多數不能恢復,希望事後恢復的是受害者名譽。整個儀式只為重新宣告人的尊嚴不可侵犯,並對觸犯者施以刑罰。於是世界上很多衝突拆解到最後,可能都是由心理層面維護尊嚴的衝動而引發。一個人和人之間的尊嚴之爭,極端時可能以制裁/仇殺告終。一個群體與另一個群體的尊嚴之爭,最極端時則發展為國與國之間的戰爭。
一個殺人如麻的日本兵,腦海裡可能還埋藏著童年時期的片段,老師教他們要成為一個好孩子。那麼「好孩子」的概念,後來發展成忠誠、服從、奉公,在大時代的氛圍下也是合理發展。然後聽到日本被欺負了,國家利益受損,自己也義憤填膺。後來他在軍隊和教官的影響下,得到了皇軍的尊嚴,最後用絕對服從軍令來餵養這份尊嚴心。另一方面,無數「好人好事」、為他人自我犧牲的案例,救災、留守、奉獻,則同樣是一樣的尊嚴心、榮譽感在運作。
香港開埠180年,特別是麥理浩十年,英國人真是埋下了現代性的炸彈。當時英國已經知道香港不會被允許解殖,但也把香港搞得非常現代化,廉政公署新市鎮地鐵郊野公園,目標是培養出香港人的自豪感,提醒他們,雖然你們以前是難民,但你們現在是「香港居民」,這個身份豪得珍惜,香港 (67暴動之後無事) 可以安居樂業,值得你們自豪。90年代一些商品廣告,都會用香港咁好,點捨得離開的講法。港英又在放手撤出階段,以白臉的方式手把手教導香港人面對政府,可以挺直腰板,據理可以力爭,有不滿可以投訴,政府向公眾問責的「普世價值」,這便是為了當時的香港人尊嚴充份加油。西方所謂公民,東方所謂君子,就是描述一群有尊嚴自覺的先鋒黨。然而這班很有自我意識的人,相互之間自然充滿各種競爭和衝突,也容易不滿,或至少可能不滿。
一群特別有尊嚴的人,就因為自發性充份發揮而特別優秀,但也特別脆弱,他們的尊嚴總可能受傷。或者尼采發現的困境:強者無法適應弱者統治的世界,甚至被後者包圍和迫害。這就是藍絲和黃絲賢達研究的大學生問題。教育教人要有尊嚴,大學生自然是理論上比較有尊嚴。一班有尊嚴的人自然有一種先天下之憂而憂的批判意識。父母教小孩子做個好人,是為他好,還是終有一天害了他?讓他有可能成為一個像嬰兒一樣自我而不妥協的人?成為因不識時務而受罰的好人?
尊嚴意識既然帶來競爭和變動,是否只要大家都沒有尊嚴,即會天下太平?問題是人們有樣學樣,追求逼格這件事就在不斷傳染。菁英和長老無符。因為有了自我意識,人們就得以經歷自己這個人格的榮辱;有了集團,就得以經歷集體的榮辱,人通過想像出集體而獲得更強烈的競爭和生存意識。雖然,這也是紛爭與互相侮辱的源頭。
美國學者管禮雅 (Liah Greenfeld) 在其名為《關於國族主義全球化的十個主張》(10 Claims Regarding the Globalization of Nationalism) 的演講內容,如題,對於國族主義是甚麼,有十個主張,第十個這樣說:「國族主義為人們帶來平民主權,帶來平等,帶來包容性的社會——即民主政治。它為人們帶來一種個人的尊嚴,我們亦因它而永遠徘徊在世界大戰的邊緣。」(Claim 10: Nationalism brings us popular sovereignty, equality, inclusive society – that is, democracy. It brings us personal dignity. And it forever keeps us on the brink of a world war.)
人和集體的思慮,由簡樸而複雜。很少可以回轉為嬰兒。嬰兒是在時光中陣亡的先行者。嬰兒鞠躬下台,成為一種有著朦朧的禁忌意識的成年人。
訂閱 patreon https://www.patreon.com/lewisdada
globalization of democracy 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的精選貼文
【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣:
The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.
What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?
While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.
COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?
To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.
Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.
Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.
The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric
While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.
Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.
Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.
Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.
The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.
On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.
Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”
The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention
But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.
Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.
This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.
However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?
▶️ 國安法:中國的現實主義框架
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjhRbV8qTgo
⏺ 中美夏威夷峰會
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