關於 resistance to civil government ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

毋忘五大訴求　公民抗命有理
—10‧20九龍遊行陳情書
（案件編號：DCCC 535/2020）

——————————————————
「毋忘初衷，活在愛和真實之中」
撐阿銘，即訂閱Patreon：
patreon.com/raphaelwong
—————————————————

胡法官雅文閣下：

　　2012年，我第一次站在法庭上承認違反「公安惡法」，述說對普選的盼望，批評公安惡法不義，並因公民抗命的緣故，甘心樂意接受刑罰。當年我說，如果小圈子選舉沒有被廢除，惡法沒有消失，我依然會一如故我，公民抗命，並且我相信將會有更多學生和市民加入這個行列。想不到時至今日，普選仍然遙遙無期，我亦再次被帶到法庭接受審判，但只是短短７年，已經有數十萬計的群眾公民抗命，反對暴政。今日，我承認違反「未經批准的政府」所訂立「未經批准的惡法」之下的「未經批准集結」罪，我不打算尋求法庭的憐憫，但請容許我佔用法庭些微時間陳情，讓法庭在判刑前有全面考慮。

暴力之濫觴

　　在整個反修例運動如火如荼之際，我正承擔另一宗公民抗命案件的刑責。雖然身在獄中，但仍然心繫手足。我在獄中電視機前見證6月9日、6月16日及8月18日三次百萬港人大遊行，幾多熱愛和平的港人冒天雨冒彈雨走上街頭，抗議不義惡法，今日關於10月20日的案件，亦是如此。可能有人會問，政府已在6月暫緩修例，更在9月正式撤回修例，我等仍然繼續示威，豈非無理取鬧？我相信法官閣下肯定聽過「遲來的正義並非正義」（Justice delayed is justice denied）這句格言。當過百萬群眾走上街頭，和平表達不滿的時候，林鄭政府沒有理睬，反而獨行獨斷，粗暴踐踏港人的意願，結果製造出後來連綿不絕的爭拗，甚至你死我活的對抗。經歷眾多衝突痛苦之後，所謂暫緩撤回，已經微不足道，我們只是更加清楚：沒有民主，就連基本人權都不會擁有！

　　在本案之中，雖然我們都沒有鼓動或作出暴力行為，但根據早前8‧18及10‧1兩宗案件，相信在控方及法庭眼中，案發當日的暴力事件仍然可以算在我們頭上，如此，我有必要問：如果香港有一個公平正義的普及選舉，人民可以在立法會直接否決他們不認可的法律，試問2019年的暴力衝突可以從何而來呢？如果我們眼見的暴力是如此十惡不赦，那麼我們又如何看待百萬人遊行後仍然堅持推行惡法的制度暴力呢？如果我們不能接受人民暴力反抗，那麼我們是否更加不能對更巨大更壓逼的制度暴力沈默不言？真正且經常發生的暴力，是漠視人民訴求的暴力，是踐踏人民意見的暴力，是剝奪人民表達權利的暴力。真正憎恨暴力，痛恨暴力的人，不可能一方面指摘暴力反抗，又容忍制度暴力。如果我需要承擔和平遊行引發出來的暴力事件的刑責，那麼誰應該承擔施政失敗所引發出來的社會騷亂的罪責呢？

社會之病根

　　對於法庭而言，可能2019年所發生的事情只是一場社會騷亂，務必追究違法者個人責任。然而，治亂治其本源，醫病醫其病根，我雖然公民抗命，刻意違法，控方把我帶上法庭，但我卻不應被理解為一個「犯罪個體」。2019年所發生的事情，並不是我一個人或我們這幾位被告可以促成，社會問題的癥結不是「犯罪份子」本身，而是「犯罪原因」。我明白「治亂世用重典」的道理，但如果「殺雞儆猴」是解決方法，就不會在2016年發生旺角騷亂及2017年上訴庭對示威者施以重刑後，2019年仍然會爆發出更大規模的暴力反抗。

如果不希望社會動亂，就必須正本清源，逐步落實「五大訴求」，從根本上改革，挽回民心。2019年反修例運動，其實只是2014年雨傘運動的延續而已，縱使法庭可能認為兩個運動皆是「一股歪風」所引起，但我必須澄清，兩個運動的核心就是追求民主普選，人民當家作主。在2019年11月24日區議會選舉這個最類近全民普選的選舉中，接近300萬人投票，民主派大勝，奪得17個區議會主導權，這就是整個反修例運動的民意，民意就是反對政府決策，反對制度暴力，反對推行惡法，不容爭辯，不辯自明。我們作為礦場裡的金絲雀，多次提醒政府撤回修法，並從根本上改革制度，而在10月20日的九龍遊行當然是反映民意的平台契機。如今，法庭對我們施加重刑，其實只不過是懲罰民意，將金絲雀困在鳥籠之內，甚至扼殺於鼓掌之中，窒礙表達自由。

堅持之重要

　　大運動過後的大鎮壓，使我們失去《蘋果日報》，失去教協，失去民陣，不少民主派領袖以及曾為運動付出的手足戰友都囚於獄中，不少曾經熱情投入運動的朋友亦因《國安法》的威脅轉為低調，新聞自由示威自由日漸萎縮，公民社會受到沈重打擊，我亦失去不少摯友，有感傷孤獨的時候，但我仍然相信，2019年香港人的信念，以及所展現人類的光輝持久未變。我不會忘記百萬人民冒雨捱熱抗拒暴政，抵制惡法，展現我們眾志成城；我不會忘記人潮紅海，讓道救護車，展現我們文明精神；我不會忘記年青志士直接行動反對苛政，捨身成仁，展現我們膽色勇氣；我不會忘記銀髮一族走上街頭保護年青人，展現我們彼此關懷；我不會忘記「五大訴求」，不會忘記2019年區議會選舉，展現我們有理有節。

　　法官閣下，我對於當日的所作所為，不感羞恥，毫無悔意。我能夠在出獄後與群眾同行一路，與戰友同繫一獄，實是莫大榮幸。若法治失去民主基石，將使法庭無奈地接受專制政權所訂立解釋的法律限制，隨時變成政治工具掃除異見，因此爭取民主普選，建設真正法治，追求公平正義，仍然是我的理想。在這條路上，如有必要，我仍然會公民抗命，正如終審法院海外非常任法官賀輔明（Lord Hoffmann）所言，發自良知的公民抗命有悠久及光榮的傳統，歷史將證明我們是正確的。我期望，曾與我一起遊行抗命的手足戰友要堅持信念，在艱難歲月裡毋忘初衷，活在愛和真實之中。

　　最後，如9年前一樣，我想借用美國民權領袖馬丁路德金牧師的一番話對我們的反對者說：「我們將以自己忍受苦難的能力，來較量你們製造苦難的能力。我們將用我們靈魂的力量，來抵禦你們物質的暴力。對我們做你們想做的事吧，我們仍然愛你們。我們不能憑良心服從你們不公正的法律，因為拒惡與為善一樣是道德責任。將我們送入監獄吧，我們仍然愛你們。」（We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. We cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws because noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. Throw us in jail and we shall still love you.）

　　願慈愛的主耶穌賜我們平安，與我和我一家同在，與法官閣下同在，與香港人同在。沒有暴徒，只有暴政；五大訴求，缺一不可！願榮耀歸上帝，榮光歸人民！

第五被告
黃浩銘
二零二一年八月十九日

Lest we forget the five demands: civil disobedience is morally justified
- Statement on 10‧20 Kowloon Rally
(Case No.: DCCC 535/2020)

Your Honour Judge Woodcock

In 2012, I stood before the court and admitted to violating the "Public Security Evil Law". I expressed my hope for universal suffrage, criticized the evil law as unjust, and willingly accepted the penalty for civil disobedience. Back then, I said that if the small-circle election had not been abolished and the draconian law had not disappeared, I would still be as determined as I was, and I believe that more students and citizens would join this movement. Today, universal suffrage is still a long way off, and I have been brought before the court again for trial. But in just seven years, hundreds of thousands of people have already risen up in civil disobedience against tyranny. Today, I plead guilty to "unauthorised assembly" under an unapproved evil law enacted by an unauthorised government. I do not intend to seek the court's mercy, but please allow me to take up a little time in court to present my case so that the court can consider all aspects before sentencing me.

The roots of violence

At the time when the whole anti-extradition law movement was in full-swing, I was taking responsibility for another civil disobedience case. Although I was in prison, my heart was still with the people. I witnessed the three million-person rallies on 9 June, 16 June and 18 August on television in prison, when many peace-loving people took to the streets despite the rain and bullets, to protest against unjust laws. Some people may ask, "The Government has already suspended the legislative amendments in June and formally withdrew the bill in September, but we are still demonstrating, are we not being unreasonable?" I am sure your Honour has heard of the adage "Justice delayed is justice denied". When more than a million people took to the streets to express their discontent peacefully, the Lam administration ignored them and instead acted arbitrarily, brutally trampling on the wishes of the people of Hong Kong, resulting in endless arguments and even confrontations. After so many conflicts and painful experiences, the so-called moratorium is no longer meaningful. We only know better: without democracy, we cannot even have basic human rights!

In this case, although we did not instigate or commit acts of violence, I believe that in the eyes of the prosecution and the court, the violence on the day of the incident can still be counted against us, based on the August 18 and October 1 case. And now I must ask - If Hong Kong had a fair and just universal election, and the public could directly veto laws they did not approve of at the Legislative Council, then how could the violent clashes of 2019 have come about? If the violence we see is so heinous, how do we feel about the institutional violence that insists on the imposition of draconian laws even after millions of people have taken to the streets? If we cannot accept violent rebellion, how can we remain silent in the face of even greater and more oppressive institutional violence? The true and frequent violence is the kind of violence that ignores people's demands, that tramples on their opinions, that deprives them of their right to express themselves. People who truly hate violence and abhor it cannot accuse violent resistance on the one hand and tolerate institutional violence on the other. If I have to bear the criminal responsibility for the violence caused by the peaceful demonstration, then who should bear the criminal responsibility for the social unrest caused by failed administration?

The roots of society's problems

From a court's point of view, it may be that what happened in 2019 was just a series of social unrest, and that those who broke the law must be held personally accountable. What happened in 2019 was not something that I alone or the defendants could have made possible, and the crux of the social problem was not the 'criminals' but the 'causes of crime'. I understand the concept of " applying severe punishment to a troubled world", but if "decimation" was really the solution, there would not have been more violent rebellions in 2019 after the Mongkok "riot" in 2016 and the heavy sentences handed down to protesters by the Court of Appeal in 2017.

If we do not want social unrest, we must get to the root of the problem and implement the "five demands" step by step, so as to achieve fundamental reforms and win back the hearts of the people. 2019's anti-revision movement is indeed a continuation of 2014's Umbrella Movement, and even though the court may think that both movements are caused by a "perverse wind", I must clarify that the core of both movements is the pursuit of democracy and universal suffrage, and the people being the masters of their own house. In the District Council election on 24 November 2019, which is the closest thing to universal suffrage, nearly 3 million people voted, and the democratic camp won a huge victory, winning majority in 17 District Councils. As canaries in the monetary coal mine, we have repeatedly reminded the government to withdraw the extradition bill and fundamentally reform the system, and the march in Kowloon on 20 October was certainly an opportunity to reflect public opinion. Now, by imposing heavy penalties on us, the court is only punishing public opinion, trapping the canaries in a birdcage, or even stifling them in the palm of their hands, suffocating the freedom of expression.

The importance of persistence

As a result of the crackdown after the mass movement, we lost Apple Daily, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union, and the Civil Human Rights Front. Many of our democratic leaders and comrades who had contributed to the movement were imprisoned, and many of our friends who had been passionately involved in the movement had been forced to lay low under the threat of the National Security Law. I still believe that the faith of Hong Kong people and the glory of humanity seen in 2019 will remain unchanged. I will never forget the millions of people who braved the rain and the heat to resist tyranny and evil laws, demonstrating our unity of purpose; I will never forget the crowds of people who gave way to ambulances, demonstrating our civility; I will never forget the young people who sacrificed their lives, demonstrating our courage and bravery; I will never forget the silver-haired who took to the streets to protect the youth, demonstrating our care for each other; I will never forget the "five demands" and the 2019 District Council election, demonstrating our rationality and decency.

Your Honour, I have nothing to be ashamed of and no remorse for what I did on that day. It is my great honour to be in prison with my comrades and to be able to walk with the public after my release. If the rule of law were to lose its democratic foundation, the courts would have no choice but to accept the legal restrictions set by the autocratic regime and become a political tool to eliminate dissent at any time. As Lord Hoffmann, a non-permanent overseas judge of the Court of Final Appeal, said, civil disobedience from the conscience has a long and honourable tradition, and history will prove us right. I hope that my comrades in arms who walked with me in protests will keep their faith and live in love and truth in the midst of this difficult time.

Finally, as I did nine years ago, I would like to say something to those who oppose us, borrowing the words of American civil rights leader Reverend Martin Luther King: "We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. We cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws because noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. Throw us in jail and we shall still love you."

Peace be with me and my family, with Your Honour, and with the people of Hong Kong. There are no thugs, only tyranny; five demands, not one less! To god be the glory and to people be the glory!

The Fifth Defendant
Wong Ho Ming
19 August 2021

#Opinion by Benny Tai Yiu-ting 戴耀廷｜"The first step is to consolidate the will of democratic resistance of all civic power nodes in civil society. "

Read more: https://bit.ly/38Ooo2B

"香港爭取民主的力量，源自公民社會，凝聚於公民社會，之後湧進議會，衝擊街頭。現這兩條路都暫受阻，自是回歸公民社會，好重整力量，應付漫長的寒冬。"
____________
📱Download the app:
http://onelink.to/appledailyapp
📰 Latest news:
http://appledaily.com/engnews/
🐤 Follow us on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/appledaily_hk
💪🏻 Subscribe and show your support:
https://bit.ly/2ZYKpHP

#AppleDailyENG

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

（本影片為隨行側拍，若要更完整、好畫質的畫面，請參考各大電視台畫面）
致辭全文：

Ladies and gentlemen, good evening, I am honored to have the opportunity to share some thoughts with all of you here. My name is Freddy Lim, a parliamentarian from Taiwan, and am affiliated with the New Power Party, which is only one year old. The NPP received a lot of support from young people in Taiwan, which made us the third largest party in the Taiwanese parliament, and a new force in Taiwanese politics. I would like to express our voices to strengthen our mutual friendship, with the hope that you may continue to be Taiwan’s strong partners, offer us your support for our participation in international organizations to make our own contribution to the world.

Despite being a country that still has a hard time joining the UN,Taiwan is, in fact, a sovereign state with territories, people, elected government, and president. Last Friday, we had our third rotation of power, showing that Taiwan’s democracy is both stable and reliable.
Taiwan has a mature public health and national health insurance system, an outstanding biotech industry, as well as rich experiences in researching and developing medicines and vaccines. We believe that, through multilateral medical cooperation, participating in the global epidemic control and becoming an official member of the WHO, we will absolutely contribute in the global fight against diseases.

The complicated history of Taiwan surfaced with the rare mention of UN Resolution 2758 in the WHA invitation to Taiwan. After World War II, the Chiang Kai-shek regime who had nowhere to go after losing the Chinese Civil War was sent to Taiwan by the Allies, where it started a prolonged authoritarian rule. Along with the regime, the international community also threw the “one China” problem to Taiwan. In 1971, the UN passed resolution 2758 to expel the Chiang Kai-shek regime occupied the seat for China. However, Chiang’s regime was not only unrepresentative of China, it did not represent the people of Taiwan either. After decades of resistance by the people, Taiwan has finally become a young democracy. Now that the Taiwanese people are extending their efforts to contribute to and participate in different aspects in the world, we sincerely hope that Taiwan would engage in more positive and respectable exchanges with the world as a normal country, to fulfill its obligations as a global citizen.

Like all of you, we firmly stands behind the universal values of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and continuously work for these values. I believe that, based on our shared values, Taiwan would absolutely become a reliable and friendly partner with supports from all the nations. I would like to sincerely thank you for being good friends of the Taiwanese people, and sincerely hope that you would continue to support our international participation. Let’s stay closer to work for a better world.

It’s a pleasure to speak to all of you here, thank you for your time, and have a good evening.